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69 
Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love?  
Evidence (or Not) from Economics and Law 
Julie A. Nelson  
ABSTRACT 
Many believe that firms are driven to maximize profits, and 
therefore are not allowed to take actions that would benefit their 
workers, communities, or the environment if these actions would 
reduce profits even slightly. This Essay shows that this belief is not 
supported by either sound economic evidence or United States 
statutory and case law. The roots of this belief are, instead, to be 
found in a centuries-old desire of economists to make our discipline 
resemble Newtonian physics. Among legal scholars, both 
misinformation and the use of University of Chicago-style economics 
have contributed to the belief‟s popularity. The dualistic “love or 
money” view appeals to scholars and the public alike because of its 
simplicity and congruence with cultural gender norms. By 
reexamining the evidence, rather than adhering to common 
ideologies, this Essay offers an unconventional analysis of corporate 
behavior and commodification. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Does profit-seeking rule out direct concern for human well-being, 
environmental sustainability, or the public interest? Many would 
answer that it does. In contemporary Western culture, we tend to 
associate profit, money, and markets with coldness, distance, and 
 
 
 
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts Boston. I would like 
to thank Marion Crain and Kimberly Krawiec for organizing a most stimulating roundtable on 
―For Love or Money,‖ and Bill Bratton for giving me especially helpful suggestions. In addition 
to the participants at the roundtable, Marjorie Kelly, Julie Matthaei, and participants at the 
World Congress for Social Economics in Montreal in 2010 also provided helpful feedback. 
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self-interest. Care and concern, on the other hand, are associated with 
love and are thought to reside elsewhere—in families and 
interpersonal relations, or in benign images of community and public 
service. 
This division between spheres of ―money‖ and ―love‖ permeates 
many discussions in the social sciences, humanities, and law, and has 
recently come to the fore in two significant ongoing controversies. 
One controversy concerns the growing marketization of activities 
such as childcare and reproductive services. When money enters 
areas traditionally associated with love, many fear that the activities 
become ―commodified‖ or ―commoditized‖ and drained of their 
authentic human meaning.
1
 The other controversy—and the main 
focus of this Article—concerns the social role of business. If 
businesses must single-mindedly pursue profits, then demanding that 
businesses become better social actors—more humane in their 
treatment of employees; more ―green‖ in their environmental impact; 
more concerned about the effect of their product on the health and 
well-being of people in their home countries and abroad—would 
seem like asking for water from a stone. There is a widespread belief 
that firms must maximize profits (i.e., get every last bit of profit they 
can) to the exclusion of any other goal. It is often claimed that 
business firms, by their very nature, must therefore reject any 
proposed action, no matter how much social benefit it could bring or 
social harm it could prevent, if it would reduce their profits by even 
one dollar.
2
 
 
 1. See, e.g., RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND 
CULTURE (Martha E. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (discussing ongoing debate about 
commodification of traditional non-commodities); Symposium, For Love or Money?, 35 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 1 (2011). I have written on this previously. See Nancy Folbre & Julie A 
Nelson, For Love or Money—or Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 123 (2000) (analyzing potential 
consequences of money entering the realm of ―love‖); JULIE A. NELSON, ECONOMICS FOR 
HUMANS 1 (2006) (critiquing the common belief that money is part of an economic ―machine‖ 
that is ―soulless and inhuman‖); Julie A. Nelson, Can We Talk? Feminist Economists in 
Dialogue with Social Theorists, 31 HYPATIA 1051 (2006) (presenting evidence refuting 
Habermasian divisions between social and economic life). 
 2. For influential popular statements of this position, see, for example, DAVID KORTEN, 
WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD 212–13 (1995) (discussing the impossibility of 
corporations being socially responsible); JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE 
PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFITS AND POWER 1–2 (2004) (―The corporation‘s legally 
defined mandate is to pursue, relentlessly and without exception, its own self-interest, 
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The idea that firms maximize profits, while extremely powerful at 
the levels of ideology and broad social belief, is vacuous at the levels 
of empirical observation and quality social science theorizing. It is 
not found in practice nearly as often as is generally assumed, nor is it 
mandated by the ―laws of economics‖ or commanded by statutory or 
case law.
3
 Rather, as this Article demonstrates, the idea was invented 
and has maintained its power to shape our thinking through mutually 
reinforcing historical, social, and political processes. The rhetoric of 
profit maximization serves to distort, rather than illuminate, our 
social reality. 
To be quite clear, this Article does not deny that great harm may 
result from treating things that are traditionally non-commercial (e.g., 
childcare, reproduction, human organs, public old-growth forests, or 
community water rights) as interchangeable ―widgets‖ that can be 
bought or sold with no concern beyond market value. The Article 
also does not deny the necessity of significant roles for governments, 
nonprofits, and community groups in providing what we need to 
sustain life and in formally or informally regulating the actions of 
business firms. It further does not deny that firms generally do try to 
make profits (among other goals).  
What this Article does seek to discredit is the belief that there is 
something intrinsic in the economic or legal structure of commerce 
that forces firms, inexorably, as if run on rails, to neglect values of 
care and concern in order to strive for every last dollar of profits. This 
widespread belief detracts from human or ecological welfare for two 
reasons. First, it lets shareholders, directors, and managers of 
corporations morally ―off the hook‖ for the social and environmental 
 
regardless of the often harmful consequences it might cause to others.‖); THE CORPORATION 
(Big Picture Media Corporation 2003) (based on Bakan‘s book). That such ideas have attained a 
considerable following is apparently in myriad books, articles, and blog posts. Typical is a blog 
post by Pierre H. Vachon (a.k.a. Mentarch): 
The reality is that companies and corporations live by one thing and one thing only: 
the bottom line. Hence, companies and corporations will do anything, regardless of 
whether they initially had good intentions or not, to keep profits not only high but also 
to increase them as well. In other words, companies and corporations will cheat, lie or 
steal . . . . This is simply the nature of the beast.  
Mentarch, When For-Profit Corporations Rule the Day, SUZIE Q‘S TRUTH AND JUSTICE BLOG 
(Aug. 27, 2007), http://suzieqq.wordpress.com/2007/08/27/corporate-dystopic-future/. 
 3. See infra Parts II, III.  
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consequences of business decisions. Second, it places the entire 
burden of maintaining the moral order onto non-business entities, 
such as government, nonprofits, and families. But these entities may 
be (and too often are) overwhelmed, lack resources, or be 
problematic themselves (e.g., corrupt, mismanaged, or abusive). The 
point of this Article is not to take a Pollyannaish stance towards 
corporations, but rather to point out that they are complex 
organizations embedded in complex situations, and can in any given 
situation act morally or immorally, wisely or unwisely—just like any 
other human organization.  
This Article first describes the economic theory of profit-
maximization and investigates the extent to which—given empirical 
evidence about firm behavior and market structure—profit-
maximization can be considered to be an inexorable ―drive.‖ Next, 
the Article examines how the rhetoric of profit maximization has 
been used within the extremely mixed and contradictory scholarly 
literature on United States corporate law. Finally, attention turns to 
the history and philosophy of economics, examining the imaginative 
whole-cloth invention of the theory of profit maximization. The idea 
that commerce is somehow a morality-free zone of human endeavor 
is shown to be a matter of ideology and rhetoric, rather than an 
economic or legal fact. 
II. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AND ECONOMICS  
The core model of mainstream economics, as it is taught in the 
United States and in many other countries, is the ―neoclassical‖ 
model in which autonomous, rational, self-interested, utility-
maximizing individuals and profit-maximizing firms interact on 
―perfectly competitive‖ markets. In such a hypothetical economy, all 
resources should end up being used in the most efficient way 
possible.  
If real-world economies acted exactly as economies in this model, 
then as a tautology firms would be profit-maximizing. To understand 
the relationship between this core neoclassical economic reasoning 
and behavior in actual economies, however, requires a careful 
understanding of both the core model and of its limitations.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/5
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A. Clarifying “Profit,” “Competition,” and “Efficiency” 
A fair amount of confusion surrounds key ideas and terms used in 
mainstream economic theory. Many people have learned, correctly, 
that the core model predicts that competition will drive firms, 
inexorably, to maximize profits. Typical of this argument, for 
example, is legal scholar Kent Greenfield‘s claim that if a firm fails 
to maximize shareholder return, ―the market will punish the managers 
severely. The stock price will fall, making the company a target for 
takeover. Companies whose managers act as if they have duties to 
stakeholders other than shareholders are squeezed out of the 
market.‖4  
But people often misunderstand the exact meaning economists 
give to the terms ―competition‖ and ―profit.‖ Because of this, they 
misinterpret much of the empirical evidence on market behavior as 
supporting their arguments, when in fact such evidence works against 
them.
5
 Some people, particularly those in the ―law and economics‖ 
field, also tend to associate economic analysis with the particular 
brand of economics promulgated by the Economics Department of 
the University of Chicago. The Chicago school takes arguments 
based on efficiency to extreme lengths. On closer examination, these 
may appear less than convincing.  
1. Profit 
Take first the issue of profit. The phrase ―profit-maximization‖ is 
often identified directly with ―greed,‖ by commentators from the 
political left as well as by many persons-on-the-street.
6
 For example, 
spectacular compensation packages granted to Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) may be taken as evidence of a ―drive for profit.‖ In 
the case of a privately owned firm managed by an individual 
owner/entrepreneur, profits and executive compensation are, for the 
 
 4. Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & 
POL‘Y REV. 1, 9 (2008). 
 5. See infra Part II.A.1–2.  
 6. Amit Bhattacharjee, Jason Dana & Jonathan Baron, Is Profit Evil? Associations of 
Profit with Social Harm (Univ. of Pa., Working Paper, 2010) (demonstrating the prevalence 
among non-economists of the belief that profits are correlated with social harm).  
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most part, the same thing. But what is often missed in the popular 
mind is that profits and executive compensation are not the same in 
modern publicly traded corporations, which are the sorts of 
businesses that now dominate economic activity in many spheres.  
Corporations are complexly structured social organizations. The 
owners of equity shares in a firm (i.e., a corporation‘s stockholders) 
are in theory supposed to be the recipients of the firm‘s profits. 
Profits are what is left over after all revenues are gathered and all 
necessary costs—including the costs of salaries for executives and 
other managers—are paid. The shareholders are supposed to receive 
the benefits of profits through payments of dividends or through 
increases in the value of their shares. For this reason, the phrases 
―maximizing profits‖ and ―maximizing value to shareholders‖ are 
often taken as roughly synonymous. A corporation has a Board of 
Directors that is supposed to oversee the management of the firm, and 
the Board in turn hires, and approves the compensation packages for, 
the executives who handle the firm‘s day-to-day operations. These 
compensation packages can include salaries (which are direct 
expenses to the corporation) and stock option bonuses (which dilute 
the value of outstanding shares). Therefore, ―profit maximization‖ or 
―maximizing value for the shareholders‖ should mean not paying any 
more than is strictly necessary to obtain managerial talent; that is, it 
should require keeping a tight rein on CEO compensation.  
The phenomenon of spectacular CEO compensation, which is 
sometimes granted even after poor performance, is hence strong 
evidence against that the idea that firms are actually governed with a 
single-minded focus on shareholder value. Shareholders are well 
aware of the distinction between profits and executive compensation, 
and are among the groups most outraged by the recent skyrocketing 
compensation packages.
7
  
 
 7. Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, available at 
http://www.money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/07/10/8380799/ (discussing 
the outrage expressed by large institutional investors about the ―deeply dysfunctional‖ CEO 
compensation system); Cari Tuna, For Some CEOs, the Perks Keep Flowing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
3, 2009, at B9 (concerning ―shareholder revolt‖); Nay on Pay: Rewarding American Bosses, 
ECONOMIST, May 15, 2010, at 95 (disussing shareholder rejection of executive pay packages). 
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2. Competition 
Now consider the issue of ―competition.‖ The business media 
carry plenty of stories about strategic campaigns by firms trying to 
increase their market shares, corporate expansions and mergers, and 
the sizeable profits earned by many companies. The power of 
companies with overwhelming market share to foist on consumers 
products that do not measure up to expected standards of quality 
(e.g., Windows Vista) or to charge outlandish prices (e.g., airline 
fares between underserved cities) may just seem to follow from the 
―drive‖ for profits. It is often thought that firms ―compete‖ with each 
other for the highest profits by strategizing to get the largest market 
share. While the occurrence of such phenomena in actual commerce 
is not in doubt, it is very far from what economists mean by 
―competition.‖ 
According to mainstream economic theory, it is in ―perfectly 
competitive‖ markets that ―market discipline‖ is a major force. In 
perfectly competitive markets—as any student in Economics 101 
learns—there are so many small-scale buyers and small-scale sellers 
of the good in question that no one buyer or seller can control, or 
even influence, the price; all units of the good in question are 
identical and interchangeable (the ―homogeneity‖ assumption); firms 
can freely enter and exit the industry; and buyers and sellers have 
complete and flawless knowledge of everything relevant, such as the 
qualities of the good or techniques of making it, the actions of others 
in the market, and relevant aspects of the future (the ―perfect 
information‖ assumption).8 In such a situation, each individual seller 
of a good would have a negligible market share, no brand name, no 
patents, no advantaged access to distribution networks—in short, no 
characteristics that distinguish it from any of the other numerous 
small, powerless suppliers. The amount of economic profit each 
seller would make, the theory tells us, would be zero.
9
 A firm that 
 
 8. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICY 194 (10th ed. 2006). 
 9. See id. at 205. The concept of ―economic profit‖ includes a return to equity holders 
just equal to what they could have gotten elsewhere. So in terms of accounting profits—the sort 
of profits we see reported in the newspapers—the theory of perfect competition predicts a 
uniform rate of return on equities across all firms.  
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does not do its absolute utmost to keep revenues up and costs down 
would, in this story, make negative economic profits and fail.
10
 
Strategically competing to increase market share is therefore not 
what mainstream economic theory means by ―competition.‖ When 
firms are able to gain market share and market power, they reduce 
the level of competition, in the economist‘s sense. When an industry 
or market is dominated by only a few firms (oligopoly) or one firm 
(monopoly), the market discipline ―drive‖ to maximize profits, 
hypothesized for perfectly competitive firms, can be considerably 
weaker or completely absent.
11
 If their market power is firmly 
bolstered by things like patents, private knowledge, strong brand 
names, control of important assets, business practices that discourage 
the entry of potential competitors, or political influence, they may 
make abnormally high profits for long periods of time, even without 
operating efficiently.
12
 They still could, in theory, pursue maximum 
profits (and mainstream theory assumes that they do), yet there is no 
market discipline ―stick‖ that tells them that they must do so.  
3. Efficiency 
In the theoretical perfectly competitive market, every resource is 
put to its most (market-) valued use. An inefficient situation is one in 
which the same resources could be used to create something of more 
value, or the same product could be made in a less costly way. Why 
would people choose to have less when they could have more? Some 
economists liken staying in an inefficient situation to leaving dollar 
bills lying on a sidewalk. Since we do not observe people leaving 
dollar bills lying on a sidewalk, they reason, we should likewise not 
see people tolerating inefficiency in economic affairs. One more step 
 
 10. According to mainstream economic theory, this sort of ―market discipline‖ 
competition would have salutary effects because it would drive all the many perfectly 
competitive firms to operate efficiently. In a dynamic setting, it is also thought to drive firms to 
innovate—to come up with new or improved products—and to quickly adopt innovations, in an 
attempt to make (quickly vanishing) positive profits. 
 11. Mainstream economic theory generally considers the case where individual firms have 
market power to be second-best, if not outright damaging, compared to the perfectly 
competitive market, because it creates inefficiency. See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 8, at 
211–56. 
 12. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/5
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in this logic takes us to the claim that whatever outcomes we observe 
from voluntary exchange in competitive markets must be efficient.  
While sometimes thought of as ―the‖ economic method of 
explanation, efficiency arguments are in fact most characteristic of 
one particular school of economics, that associated with the 
University of Chicago Economics Department. Broadly adapting 
Darwinian-like arguments about competition eliminating weak (that 
is, inefficient) actors, the Chicago school has great faith in the ―self-
regulation‖ of markets.13 They therefore believe that government 
involvement in economic affairs is nearly always unnecessary and 
pernicious. Much of the ―law and economics‖ field has been 
dominated by the Chicago school through the influence of scholars 
such as Gary Becker and Richard Posner.
14
  
Many other economists, however, disagree. The standard 
Principles of Economics textbook approach starts with perfect 
competition, but then makes the picture more complicated. The 
textbooks discuss monopoly and oligopoly, externalities, public 
goods, imperfect information, and other causes of ―market failure‖—
that is, situations in which reliance on markets leads to inefficient 
outcomes.
15
 And many contemporary economists go beyond the 
 
 13. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983) (asserting that ―[a]bsent fiat, the form of organization 
that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the 
lowest price while covering costs‖ and citing to research on natural selection). 
 14. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Law, Economic Analysis of, THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/ 
article?id= pde2008_L000038 (last visited May 15, 2011).  
 15. Introductory textbooks argue that firms with market power will usually produce at less 
than the efficient level. Some also mention that they may become complacent and fail to seek 
out profitable innovations, or that they may deliberately keep their profits below the maximum 
possible in order to avoid attracting government regulatory attention.  
 Externalities (such as pollution) mean that there are benefits and costs to economic activity 
that are not reflected in market prices.  
 Public goods (such as police protection) would be produced at inefficiently low levels 
without the use of non-market institutions.  
 Imperfect knowledge about the quality of goods or services—or simply about an uncertain 
future—also may result in ex post inefficient outcomes.  
 Textbooks generally advocate governmental action in the form of breaking up or regulating 
monopolies and providing public goods. They also discuss potential roles for government 
legislation and regulation in dealing with externalities and information problems. The amount 
of emphasis given to market inefficiency and government action differs according to the 
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standard textbook critiques, discussing how human psychology of 
cognition and motivation, history, organizational structure, habits and 
norms, concentrations of power, social context and cultural biases, 
uncertainty about the future, political struggles, and other phenomena 
play important roles in shaping economic life.
16
 While most 
economists recognize the logic of the dollars-on-the-sidewalk 
argument, we also recognize that in the real world choices are rarely, 
if ever, so easy or so clear. We discern in the arguments from 
Chicago-style economists a tautology: They see efficient markets 
everywhere because they take an assumption of market efficiency as 
their starting point.
17
 
 
predilections of a textbook‘s authors, but a textbook that completely ignores these issues would 
be considered seriously incomplete. 
 16. See, e.g., COLIN F. CAMERER ET AL., ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3–13 
(2004) (discussing behavioral economics); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1998) (discussing ―New‖ Institutionalist economics); PAUL R. 
KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS 102–03, 111–13 (2000) (discussing 
Keynesian economics). While these varieties of economics tend to follow the mainstream in 
their methods and definitions of economics, a variety of ―heterodox‖ schools offer deeper 
critiques. See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The Approach of Institutionalist Economics, 36 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 166 (1998) (discussing ―Old‖ institutional economies); PAUL DAVIDSON, 
THE KEYNES SOLUTION: THE PATH TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPERITY (2009) (discussing 
Post-Keynesian economics). For discussions of feminist economics, socio-economics and 
radical economics, see articles in Feminist Economics, the Review of Social Economy, and the 
Review of Radical Political Economy, respectively. 
 To get a flavor of these arguments, consider two often-discussed critiques of the idea that 
efficiency will always prevail. The first, from the field of economic history, concerns the 
contemporary prevalence of the QWERTY keyboard. While a simple efficiency argument 
would dictate that this keyboard layout must dominate alternatives because of its superiority in 
speed or ease of use, the actual history shows something quite different. It was invented as a 
way to slow down typing since, at the time, jamming of mechanical keys was a problem. See 
Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332–33 (1985). 
The second critique comes from noting that it takes time for competitive processes, even if they 
are present and strong, to do their selective work. While Chicago-style economists like to 
concentrate on the (supposedly efficient) ―long run‖ case, John Maynard Keynes once famously 
quipped, ―In the long run, we are all dead.‖ JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACTION MONETARY 
REFORM (1923). That is, perhaps what actually matters most for economic analysis and human 
life is in the (possibly inefficient) ―short run.‖ 
 17. The Chicago school economists have replies—often rather clever and elegant ones—
to those who point out cases of apparent market power and non-profit-maximizing behavior. 
Large, powerful firms, for example, may be thought to so fear the smallest threat of competition 
that they are induced to act as efficiently as the ―perfectly competitive‖ firms of the theory. 
Extremely high CEO salaries might be justified as efficient on the grounds that they are 
necessary in order to attract the necessary managerial talent in a highly competitive market for 
executives. Those less convinced of the extent and strength of competition, on the other hand, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/5
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B. The Empirical Evidence: Business Leaders Face Choices 
The economic-theory-dictates-a-drive-for-market-share story 
about profit maximization confuses two very different meanings of 
―competition.‖ Which meaning of the term seems to be empirically 
more important in contemporary industrialized economies: razor‘s 
edge conditions forcing zero-profit conditions on anonymous firms 
(as assumed in the Chicago school) or strategic jockeying among 
large and powerful corporations?
18
  
1. The Reality 
Companies like Wal-Mart, ExxonMobil, IBM, Verizon, 
Microsoft, Goldman-Sachs, and Citibank are hardly the sort of 
anonymous, powerless companies that populate the neoclassical 
theory of perfect competition. With large market shares, immense 
financial resources, and active lobbying arms, they are more creators 
of markets than slaves to them. Because the economic conditions 
they face do not dictate their decisions, these companies normally 
operate with some ―slack‖ or ―surplus‖—that is, some excess of 
revenues over strictly necessary expenses. This slack gives them 
some room for discretion. They may choose to pay outlandish 
salaries to their CEOs, buy corporate jets, hire lobbyists, go on 
acquisitions binges, or manage in a lazy and antiquated fashion.
19
 Or 
they could do other, positive, things. Since many large businesses are 
not on a razor‘s edge of competition, economic pressure does not 
dictate that they keep their costs at an absolute minimum and always 
seek to increase their revenues, no matter what.  
 
in addition to noting the tautological nature of the arguments, may point out that these 
arguments conveniently serve the interests of powerful companies and wealthy in-groups.  
 18. The point here about importance is a relative one. Some industries, such as 
subcontracted clothing assembly, are very competitive on a global scale. Economists sometimes 
talk about ―dual-sector theory,‖ which is the idea that economies can be dominated by an 
oligopolistic center surrounded by a competitive fringe. NEVA GOODWIN ET AL., 
MICROECONOMICS IN CONTEXT 421 (2d ed. 2009).  
 19. Recent empirical evidence shows that the level of management skill varies widely 
across contemporary firms, providing evidence against the notion that all firms are driven to 
efficient operation. See Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, Why Do Management Practices 
Differ Across Firms and Countries?, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 203 (2010) (presenting evidence that 
variations in the quality of management may explain difference in productivity). 
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Since information in the real world is far from ―perfect,‖ these 
companies may also invest in large quantities of dodgy assets. The 
recent financial crisis has presented quite a challenge to the 
economics profession. It seems that something went very wrong with 
the pricing of housing and related financial assets during the period 
leading up to 2007, and that this caused the resulting financial crisis. 
Mainstream economists, even some with notably conservative or 
Chicago leanings, have had renewed reason to engage in soul-
searching about whether the model of perfect markets is such a good 
starting place for our analysis.
20
  
2. Why It Matters 
None of the preceding is meant to deny that firms usually try to be 
profitable, or that they generally have to take market conditions and 
the actions of their competitors or potential competitors into account 
when making their decisions. The point is that while competition is 
often thought of as an omnipresent and powerful force in economics, 
akin to gravity in physical science, it is resisted at many points (just 
as, in the physical world, airplanes resist gravity) and is also far from 
the only powerful influence on economic behavior.  
Nor is the point to deny that greed-fed pursuit of money or power 
or both can often motivate the decisions of board members and 
executives. The point to be taken from the arguments made above is 
that there is considerable empirical evidence that many firms—and 
especially large, powerful ones—remain in business and even 
 
 20. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 
2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 36, available at http://nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06 
Economic-t.html; Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B1; John Cassidy, Rational Irrationality, Interview with Richard 
Posner, NEW YORKER, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/ 
2010/01/interview-with-richard-posner.html. A notable exception is the case of University of 
Chicago economist Eugene Fama, creator of the ―efficient markets‖ theory. This theory, which 
asserts that that asset prices efficiently reflect information about economic fundamentals, is now 
highly doubted by most observers of the recent financial crisis. Facts, however, are no match 
for a strongly held belief in markets, competition, and efficiency. Fama continues to deny that 
asset bubbles can exist. See John Cassidy, Rational Irrationality, Interview with Eugene Fama, 
NEW YORKER, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/ 
interview-with-eugene-fama.html. 
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flourish while making decisions that are not in the best interest of 
their shareholders.  
This may seem like a hair-splitting argument to those who, when 
using ―profit maximization,‖ simply refer more vaguely to greed, 
monetary incentives, or making some profit. But, for those 
considering the role of ―love‖ in business relations (that is, the role of 
social responsibility, interpersonal relations, or considerations of 
care) the distinction is important. If corporations, by their own 
intrinsic nature or the nature of markets, must always single-mindedly 
serve the economic interests of their shareholders, their decision-
makers cannot act out of any other concern. They cannot, if this is so, 
act out of concern for employees, communities, customers, creditors, 
the natural environment, or society and humanity at large—groups 
often referred to as corporate ―stakeholders‖21—if such action would 
damage profits even slightly.  
Of course, in many cases, taking care of these other stakeholders 
in the short run can benefit shareholders in the long run by improving 
worker morale or a company‘s reputation. There is likely much to be 
gained by promoting the idea of ―doing well by doing good.‖22 
Arguably, in terms of concrete consequences, it may not matter much 
whether a company treats its employees well or goes ―green‖ because 
these practices can be expected to increase profits or because the 
management believes that the company has a responsibility to do the 
right thing. However, for thinking about the role of business in 
society and about likely company actions over the long term under 
changing conditions, it makes a big difference. Do we believe that 
companies are mechanical actors ―driven‖ by a single goal? If so, we 
must rest our hopes for responsible behavior on government 
 
 21. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 24–
27 (1984) (describing ―stakeholders‖ as ―groups and individuals that can affect, or are affected 
by,‖ a firm‘s accomplishments). 
 22. See, e.g., ROY M. SPENCE, JR. WITH HALEY RUSHING, IT‘S NOT WHAT YOU SELL, IT‘S 
WHAT YOU STAND FOR: WHY EVERY EXTRAORDINARY BUSINESS IS DRIVEN BY PURPOSE 
(2009) (praising companies that are ―driven by purpose‖); RAJENDRA S. SISODIA, DAVID B. 
WOLFE & JAGDISH N. SHETH, FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES 
PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE 16–17 (2007) (noting that certain generous corporations, 
or ―Firms of Endearment,‖ can return more to investors than the S&P 500 firms); RIANE 
EISLER, THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: CREATING A CARING ECONOMICS 47–68 (2007) 
(arguing that businesses must be ―socially and financially profitable‖). 
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legislation and regulation, consumer pressure, or the rise of a 
completely ―alternative‖ (e.g., cooperative) economy. We must also 
assume that corporate actions that appear to be in the public interest 
are always merely cosmetic, instrumental, and contingent. On the 
other hand, what if corporations are complex social organizations 
embedded in, and acting upon, their social and natural environment? 
In this case, rather than envisioning corporations as wild bulls to be 
strongly fenced in, or evil entities to be entirely supplanted, one must 
consider the possibility that they may be able to commit their own 
(considerable) energies to social and environmental good.  
The empirical evidence suggests that many firms are able to 
diverge from profit maximization in order to choose to do socially 
deleterious things. Why, then, would they not be able to choose to 
diverge from profit maximization for other, more worthy, reasons? 
III. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AND THE LAW 
What about the argument that profit maximization is required by 
law? In legal scholarship, the idea that the purpose of a firm is profit 
maximization is often stated in terms of the ―shareholder primacy‖ 
doctrine, which states that directors and managers must strive to 
serve the interests, usually assumed to be exclusively financial, of 
shareholders above any other goal. But the status of this doctrine is in 
dispute. Debates in favor of or against the doctrine are said to go back 
to a famous debate in the 1930s between Adolph A. Berle, Jr., and E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
23
 and continue in high volume today. To an 
outsider approaching these legal debates, the divergence of 
contemporary opinions and the degree of confidence with which they 
are variously asserted are striking. 
 
 23. Berle was in favor of shareholder primacy. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365–72 (1932). Dodd argued for a 
broader view. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1145, 1145–63 (1932). 
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A. The Arguments in Favor 
On the ―pro‖ side, some contemporary legal scholars believe that 
profit maximization is required by law, or at least that it used to be 
the law though more recently it has become somewhat attenuated or 
challenged.
24
 Another belief is that, while it was not clearly the law in 
the past, it is clearly the law now.
25
 Finally, there is the belief that, 
while there are some exceptions in practice, it is still the dominant 
legal understanding
26
 and force guiding business decisions,
27
 so that 
new or reformed rules for enterprise would need to be established to 
permit the pursuit of social goals.
28
  
Proponents interpret laws related to fiduciary duty as prescribing 
maximization of shareholder value. Legal cases often cited in favor 
of shareholder primacy include Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (―A 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
 
 24. For example, Alissa Mickels refers to ―the historical role of making a profit.‖ Alissa 
Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-Benefit 
Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT‘L & 
COMP. L. REV. 271, 302 (2009) (emphasis added). Lisa M. Fairfax argues that while 
shareholder primacy is ―traditional‖ and ―prevailing‖ and seems to guide current conduct, it is 
also at odds with recent upsurges in stakeholder rhetoric used by corporations, which respond to 
a perhaps stakeholder-based public norm concerning corporate purposes. Lisa M. Fairfax, The 
Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 675, 711–12 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 4, at 6 (―Traditionally, large corporations were seen 
as quasi-public institutions with social responsibilities that came as condition of their charter. 
But beginning just over a century ago . . . [c]orporations came to be seen as supremely private 
entities, whose primary purpose was making money.‖); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001) (―The triumph of the 
shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured, 
even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago.‖).  
 26. Mickels, supra note 24, at 282 (―Scholars claim that a corporate manager‘s only 
objectives are to sustain monetary growth for the company and to increase company and 
shareholder value.‖).  
 27. Greenfield, supra note 4, at 8–9 (―The fact remains, however, that because of a mix of 
law, norms, and market dynamics, the touchstone of corporate success is the maximization of 
shareholder return. There are exceptions . . . . But these exceptions are just that, and are 
unsustainable in the long term. On the whole, shareholder primacy is a fact of life in the United 
States in the early twenty-first century.‖).  
 28. See, e.g., Mickels, supra note 24, at 279–80 (calling for alternative legal forms 
supporting ―For-Benefit‖ corporations); Greenfield, supra note 4, at 5 (calling for ―reforms‖); 
Cheri A. Budzynski, Can a Feminist Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility Break Down 
the Barriers of the Shareholder Primacy Doctrine?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 435, 438 (2006) 
(calling for a standard of ―care‖). 
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profit of the stockholders‖)29 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc. (once a firm is being sold, the directors should 
aim at ―getting the best price for the stockholders‖).30 The case of 
Equity-Linked Investors v. Adams, where the court granted the 
interests of holders of common stock priority over those of holders of 
preferred stock, may also be mentioned.
31
 In In re The Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware court explicitly adopted the 
position that the goal of a corporation is profit maximization, making 
references to ―efforts to maximize shareholders‘ investment‖ and the 
corporate decision-makers‘ duty ―to make informed decisions on 
behalf of the shareholders.‖32 
Some argue that directors who fail to maximize value for 
shareholders will commonly face shareholder derivative suits, in 
which shareholders bring complaints about management decisions 
before a court.
33
 Fear of such suits is thought to goad managers to 
stay on the narrow path of profit-maximization. In addition, drawing 
on arguments from economics, it is also argued that non-profit-
maximizing firms will be subject to hostile takeovers or other forms 
of ―market discipline.‖34 Yet another argument is that profit 
maximization has a noted advantage over other possible goals for 
firms because of its ―tidy,‖ single-valued, relatively simple nature, as 
opposed to the more vague and potentially conflicting balancing of 
multiple stakeholder interests.
35
 Some argue that shareholder 
 
 29. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 30. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).  
 31. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997).  
 32. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005). I 
thank Bill Bratton for alerting me to these last two cases. 
 33. Mickels, supra note 24, at 273. While acknowledging that successful suits against 
corporations for excessive charitable donations have not in fact occurred, Mickels‘s arguments 
for explicit new ―For-Benefit‖ language in corporate bylaws and state statutes implicitly 
assumes such suits are a common and significant obstacle to socially responsible behavior 
under existing regimes. New legal approaches would allow For-Benefit corporations to ―avoid 
shareholder derivative suits when other [that is, non-shareholder] contituents are served.‖ Id. at 
273. 
 34. For example, Greenfield argues that if a firm fails to maximize shareholder return, 
―the market will punish the managers severely. The stock price will fall, making the company a 
target for takeover. Companies whose managers act as if they have duties to stakeholders other 
than shareholders are squeezed out of the market.‖ Greenfield, supra note 4, at 9. 
 35. See Fairfax, supra note 24, at 680 (noting the seeming advantage of shareholder 
primacy theory‘s ―tidy focus‖); see also Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder 
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primacy, along with measuring the success of management decisions 
by stock market prices, has been proven by economic logic to be the 
most efficient mode of organization.
36
 Proponents of this view point 
out that the Principles of Corporate Governance put forward by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) describe the corporate objective as 
―business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain.‖37 One example the ALI discusses concerns 
keeping a money-losing manufacturing plant open indefinitely for the 
sake of the workers. The ALI concludes that such an action would be 
unacceptable.
38
 
Others are more careful in their endorsement of shareholder 
primacy, noting that while they believe it to be the law in theory, its 
enforcement in practice is compromised by the ―business judgment 
rule.‖39 That is, since it might be nearly impossible in practice to 
predict whether a particular business decision will lead to good or 
bad outcomes, courts generally defer to the informed judgment of a 
business‘s managers. As a result, executives are largely protected 
from the sorts of shareholder lawsuits that more naïve commentators 
seem to assume are common and effective. In the more sophisticated 
literature, the problem is often seen as one of making corporate 
managers more responsive to shareholders so that a corporation will 
do what it presumably should do (i.e., maximize profits).
40
 Borrowing 
from economic principal-agent theory, a voluminous literature has 
 
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2001, at 8, 9 
(arguing in favor of the ―clarity of mission provided by a single-valued objective function‖). 
 36. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 25, at 441, 449 (―[T]he market value of the 
publicly traded corporation‘s shares is the principal measure of its shareholders‘ interests. . . . 
[T]his model offers greater efficiencies than the principal alternatives.‖).  
 37. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(a) (1994).  
 38. Id. § 2.01, cmt. i, illus. 19. 
 39. See, e.g., Mickels, supra note 24, at 283 (―When making day-to-day decisions, courts 
apply the business judgment rule . . . .‖); Fairfax, supra note 24, at 685 (―When applied, the 
business judgment rule results in . . . wide discretion afforded to directors to make decisions on 
behalf of the corporation, apparently even those that forgo shareholder profit. . . . In fact, 
outside of the takeover context, there are no reported cases in which courts have overturned 
directors‘ decision to favor a constituent group over-shareholders‘ profit.‖). 
 40. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility and the Volatile 
Shareholder Interest, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 55, 57 (2006) (―The discussants all posit the 
maximization of shareholder value as the firm‘s objective and agree that such value as the 
firm‘s objective and agree that such value can be enhanced by aligning management‘s interests 
with those of the shareholders.‖). 
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arisen concerning how to properly incentivize executives with salary 
and bonus packages.
41
  
Notably, conservative University of Chicago economist Milton 
Friedman is often quoted as saying that the duty of corporate 
executives is to ―make as much money as possible‖ for the 
shareholders.
42
 Some proponents of this view claim that the dispute 
has been definitively settled. Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman wrote in their 2001 article, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, that ―there is today a broad normative consensus that 
shareholders alone are the parties to whom corporate managers 
should be accountable.‖43 
B. The Arguments Against  
It is undeniable that creating returns for shareholders is generally 
an important corporate goal. However, people who argue against 
shareholder primacy view corporations as social organizations who 
must to some degree balance the concerns of various stakeholders, 
rather than slavishly serve only one constituent. Opponents of the 
doctrine of shareholder primacy argue that profit maximization is not 
the law now, nor has it ever (to any appreciable extent) been the 
 
 41. Michael Jensen and William Meckling‘s article Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure is widely credited as providing the theoretical 
justification for using stock options to (supposedly) give corporate managers incentives that 
would serve shareholder interests: ―One solution to [differing goals] would be to establish 
incentive compensation systems for the manager or to give him stock options.‖ Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 353 (1976). 
 42. See Greenfield, supra note 4, at 8 (quoting Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32). 
Interestingly, however, Friedman went on to state that executives operate within an ethical 
context: their goal ―generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to 
their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom.‖ Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (emphasis added). While clearly an endorsement of shareholder 
primacy, Friedman‘s view is hence not necessarily the simple endorsement of profit-at-any-cost 
that it is often taken to be.  
 43. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 25, at 441; see also William W. Bratton & 
Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy‟s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern 
Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100, 102 (2008) (―Shareholder primacy prevails today as the 
dominant view . . . . Today‘s mainstream assumes maximal returns to the firm as the only end 
. . . .‖).  
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law.
44
 They point out that a mandate to maximize shareholder value 
is not based in statutory law, and only very rarely applied in case law.  
Contrary to popular belief, state laws that charter corporations do 
not mandate profit maximization.
45
 Even in Delaware, where many 
corporations are chartered because of its advantageous codes, the 
corporate code states that corporations may be formed ―to conduct or 
promote any lawful business or purpose.‖46 Nor do most firms choose 
to incorporate shareholder primacy as a goal in their own charters.
47
 
On the contrary, many seem eager to express their dedication to 
broader responsibilities.
48
 
Those who dispute shareholder primacy call attention to the fact 
that fiduciary duty is generally interpreted as the duty of officers to 
serve ―the corporation‖, which is vaguely defined, and inclusive of 
interests beyond shareholder financial interest.
49
 The main purpose of 
this duty is not to raise shareholders above all other stakeholders, but 
rather to prevent self-dealing by the managers themselves.
50
 The 
ALI‘s Principles of Corporate Governance, while recognizing the 
goal of shareholder gain, also allows consideration of ethical issues 
and diversion of resources to serve public goals.
51
 A decision to keep 
 
 44. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733, 738 (2005) (―Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to 
maximize corporate profits. Rather, they have always had some legal discretion (implicit or 
explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest.‖). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
163, 169 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). 
 47. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1189, 1207 (2002). 
 48. Claudio Loderer et al., Shareholder Value: Principles, Declarations, and Actions, 39 
FIN. MGMT. 5, 11–19 (2010) (noting that more corporate website mission statements reference 
social responsibility than reference importance of shareholders); Martin Calkins & Jonathan B. 
Wight, The Ethical Lacunae in Friedman‟s Concept of the Manager, 11 J. MARKETS & 
MORALITY 221, 229 (2008) (―A slew of management and leadership literature indicates that 
managers and entrepreneurs are not motivated primarily by profit maximizing . . . .‖). 
 49. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 46, at 169 (―The Delaware corporate code . . . does not 
define the corporate purpose as shareholder wealth maximization.‖); Elhauge, supra note 44, at 
769 (―But duty of care laws never define the ‗best interests of the corporation‘ as meaning 
solely the interests of shareholders, nor do they ever define the interests of the corporation or 
shareholders to mean solely their financial interests.‖).  
 50. Self-dealing refers to a manager making decisions that serve his or her own personal 
advantage, rather than benefiting of the corporation (e.g., misappropriating funds or hiring 
unqualified relatives). 
 51. AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b)(2)—(3); see also 
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a manufacturing plant open for three months, at a loss of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, in order to give time for workers to adjust is, for 
example, considered consistent with legal principles.
52
 
Opponents note that the often quoted language from Dodge—a 
case from 1919—was merely judicial dicta, and argue that the 
decision on the merits of case actually concerned the duty of majority 
shareholders to not trample on the rights of minority shareholders, 
and was not about the social responsibility of business.
53
 Equity-
Linked Investors likewise shows the courts intervening to resolve 
disputes among shareholders, and does not shed light on the issue of 
whether shareholders‘ interests take primacy over, or should be 
balanced with, the interests such as those of workers, communities, or 
the environment. Those who dispute shareholder primacy point out 
that the doctrine stated in Revlon was later so narrowed by the 
Delaware courts that it has become ―doctrinal deadwood.‖54 Shortly 
before Revlon, the Delaware courts in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co.
55
 opined that, in fulfilling their duties to ―the corporate 
enterprise,‖ directors should consider ―the impact on ‗constituencies‘ 
other than shareholders (that is, creditors, customers, employees, and 
perhaps even the community generally).‖56 Shareholder primacy 
opponents point to constituency statutes, adopted in a majority of 
states, that explicitly give managers the discretion to consider the 
interests of non-shareholder groups.
57
 They emphasize that the 
―business judgment rule‖ gives directors and managers considerable 
leeway in their decisions.
58
 A court will usually accept any business 
purpose expressed by managers, or may even create a justification 
should the managers fail to give one.
59
 
 
Elhauge, supra note 44, at 738.  
 52. AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01, cmt. i, illus. 20.  
 53. Stout, supra note 46, at 167–68; D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 
23 J. CORP. L. 277, 315–20 (1998). 
 54. Stout, supra note 47, at 1204; see also Fairfax, supra note 24, at 686. 
 55. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 56. Stout, supra note 46, at 170 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954, 955).  
 57. Elhauge, supra note 44, at 861–62. 
 58. See Eric Talley, On the Demise of Shareholder Primacy (or, Murder on the James 
Trains Express), 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1212–13 (2002); Elhauge, supra note 44, at 738 
(arguing that the business judgment rule gives managers discretion to profit-sacrifice).  
 59. See Stout, supra note 46, at 171 (discussing judicial eagerness to protect directors in 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968)).  
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Opponents also argue that, while hostile takeovers make the 
headlines, they are relatively rare in practice.
60
 They point to specific 
cases of long-running firms that have shamelessly pursued goals 
other than profit maximization.
61
 They argue that the idea that there is 
one identifiable ―shareholder interest‖ to be pursued is mythical:  
Different shareholders have different investment time frames, 
different tax concerns, different attitudes toward firm-level risk 
due to different levels of diversification, different interests in 
other investments that might be affected by corporate 
activities, and different views about the extent to which they 
are willing to sacrifice corporate profits to promote broader 
social interests.
62
  
Some use sophisticated arguments from options theory, contracting, 
and bargaining to create logical arguments for a stakeholder view.
63
  
Some literature on the ―con‖ side claims that the dispute has been 
definitively settled. Eric Talley writes that ―the shareholder primacy 
argument has increasingly become a straw person among 
academics.‖64 He summarizes contemporary corporate law as: ―Don‘t 
jerk around any constituency too badly, and you‘ll be ok.‖65  
 
 60. Talley, supra note 58, at 1212 (―[O]ne need not presume . . . that the specter of an 
acquisition constitutes a defining characteristic of a firm‘s identity.‖). 
 61. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975, 976 (2006) (―[T]he executives at AOL believed in the faith of 
shareholder primacy. . . . Time Warner, on the other hand, had a culture that placed the 
institution above the shareholder, and journalistic ethics above any requirement to make short-
term profits.‖); see also ANDRÉ SCHIFFRIN, THE BUSINESS OF BOOKS: HOW INTERNATIONAL 
CONGLOMERATES TOOK OVER PUBLISHING AND CHANGED THE WAY WE READ 73–102 (2001) 
(discussing differences between the goals behind book publishing resulting from changes in 
ownership and management at Random House).  
 62. Stout, supra note 46, at 174; cf. Bratton, supra note 40, at 57 (―This Article unpacks 
the notion of the shareholder, introducing a more particularized account in which the unitary 
model of the shareholder disintegrates into a differentiated cast of characters made up of 
investors, speculators, noise traders, fundamental value investors, short-term holders, long-term 
holders, dumb money, and smart money.‖).  
 63. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 47, at 1195–99 (outlining efficiency arguments in Margaret 
Blair and Lynn A. Stout‘s ―Team Production‖ model); Talley, supra note 58, at 1214 (briefly 
discussing of Talley‘s work using contracting theory).  
 64. Talley, supra note 58, at 1214. 
 65. Id. at 1216 (internal quotations omitted).  
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C. An Analysis 
While those arguing the ―pro‖ side may grant that the ―con‖ 
arguers have valid points and that there are exceptions to profit 
maximization, they generally dismiss these points as (isolated) 
exceptions that prove the (general) rule. But the discussion on the 
―pro‖ side tends to slide from an argument about what firms are 
actually required to do by law, to what they should be required to do. 
It becomes an ontological or teleological discussion about the true 
―nature‖ or ―purpose‖ of business. The arguments in favor of strict 
shareholder primacy seem to have a relative dearth of empirical 
support, instead relying to a large degree on a particular, narrow body 
of economic theory. The profit maximization doctrine appears to 
operate far more strongly at the level of theory or ideology than at the 
level of actual practice in business management and corporate law. In 
short, it seems to be a case of ―transcendental nonsense.‖66 
To see how thoroughly the (faulty) Chicago-style, perfect-free-
markets-and-efficiency argument has permeated this literature, 
consider again In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.
67
 The 
case is a classic shareholder derivative suit, of the sort that many 
imagine to be effective in enforcing profit maximization. Former 
Disney president Michael Ovitz had been granted severance pay in an 
amount that the court acknowledged was ―breathtaking.‖68 A group 
of shareholders subsequently sued, alleging that when the CEO and 
board approved the pay and severance packages, they breached their 
fiduciary duty.
69
 The rhetoric of the decision makes it clear that the 
court believed that, as an ontological issue, increasing shareholder 
value is the proper purpose of a corporation. But does this judgment 
confirm that profit-maximization is legally enforceable and that 
executives who fail to do what the shareholders want will be 
reprimanded or punished by the courts? Far from it! The court ruled 
against the shareholder plaintiffs on the grounds that ―[t]he redress 
 
 66. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 812 (1935) (noting that legal abstraction, or ―transcendental nonsense,‖ is 
―entirely useless when we come to study, describe, predict, and criticize legal phenomena‖). 
 67. 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 68. Id. at 698. 
 69. Id. at 697.  
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for failures that arise from faithful management must come from the 
markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of 
capital,‖ and not from the courts.70 Concluding that the decision-
makers‘ actions, while falling ―significantly short of the best 
practices of ideal corporate governance,‖ did not constitute gross 
negligence, the court invoked the business judgment rule.
71
 
Enforcement of ―best practices,‖ it said, should be left to the free 
market.
72
 
Rather than asserting shareholder primacy as a principle 
enforceable in the courts, the court in Disney leaves the enforcement 
up to Chicago school ―self-regulating‖ markets. Following the 
Chicago school, the court found that there is no need for 
―interference‖ by any state organization—including the court itself.73 
This is a rather stunning result: the law-and-economics approach at 
this point devolves into a situation where legal institutions 
themselves are seen as redundant. 
 
 70. Id. at 698 (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. at 697. 
 72. Another facet of the case also illustrates the influence of Chicago economics. The 
court found ―thorough and convincing‖ an economic argument concerning the valuation of 
options that was based on the Black-Scholes option model. Id. at 745. Fischer Black and Myron 
Scholes both spent time in the University of Chicago economics department and, while their 
work received a Nobel Prize, it has since become quite controversial. Scholes‘s own investment 
company (LTCM) required a bailout from the Fed, and some suggest that the popularity of the 
model contributed to the subprime crisis. See PABLO TRIANA, LECTURING BIRDS ON FLYING: 
CAN MATHEMATICAL THEORIES DESTROY THE FINANCIAL MARKETS? 177–242 (2009) 
(critiquing the Black-Scholes model). The ALI, in contrast, points out several weaknesses in 
relying on markets to enforce good management:  
The discipline of the product and new-capital markets, while significant, is also subject 
to important limitations. For example, a corporation may earn profits and survive for a 
long time despite bad management, just as it may incur losses or even fail despite good 
management. A corporation with a large cash flow may be able to meet its capital 
needs through internal and even external financing although its profits are lower than 
good management would produce. Similarly the discipline of tender offers is limited 
by a number of elements, including the high costs of takeover bids, the need to offer a 
premium well above the market, the defensive techniques available under the relevant 
statues, and the time lag often experienced by the public in ascertaining lack of 
managerial efficiency.  
AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Part III.1 (introductory note). The ALI 
gives these as reasons why oversight by a board of directors and its committees is important. 
 73. Disney, 907 A.2d at 698 (regulation must ―come from the markets‖). 
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The influence of Chicago-style thinking is also apparent in many 
of the arguments made by those on the other side of the fence. Those 
who dispute that profit maximization is dictated by law often couch 
their arguments primarily in terms of efficiency.
74
 While theoretical 
arguments based on efficiency may be interesting, one should keep in 
mind that, outside of the world of idealized perfect competition, just 
because something can be shown to be efficient does not mean that it 
necessarily exists (or vice versa). Of course, theories about efficiency 
can be used to argue why the legal system should endorse a particular 
goal or structure. But, contrary to some economists‘ elevation of 
efficiency to a summum bonum, in this normative case it also needs to 
be remembered that there are a number of other worthy goals for 
corporate behavior besides efficiency.
75
 These may include justice; 
fairness; commitment; aiding the needy, future generations, or the 
environment; or practicalities of implementation. The neglect of such 
goals seems to be the result of the influence on scholarly legal debate 
of an overly economistic approach. 
Lynn A. Stout suggests that the appeal of profit maximization 
thinking among legal scholars is that it ―serves professors‘ pressing 
need for a simple answer to the question of what corporations do,‖76 
and that by using something propounded by Ph.D. economists it ―lent 
an attractive patina of scientific rigor‖ to the study of corporations.77 
This latter point brings us to the topic of economics and its status as a 
―science.‖ 
IV. THE INVENTION AND PERSISTENCE OF AN IDEOLOGY 
While the idea that businesses make profits has probably been 
around for as long as business itself, the belief that firms must 
maximize profits originated in the discipline of economics. While 
 
 74. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 47, at 1197–99; Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in 
Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 640–46 (2006).  
 75. For more discussion on this, see Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 536 (2006) (arguing that some scholars‘ 
―reliance on the normative criterion of efficiency commits them to an impoverished conception 
of ethics‖). 
 76. Stout, supra note 46, at 175. 
 77. Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on ―Shareholder Primacy‖ 5 (Jan. 10, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/bus.sloan-stout.pdf. 
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people in law, social science, the humanities, or journalism who use 
this phrase might assume that the idea came from diligent, empirical 
research by economists studying the actual workings of firms, the 
real story is quite different. Profit maximization is, in reality, a 
theoretical invention, deeply rooted in particular (and quite peculiar) 
ideas of what an economy is, what science is, and what a firm is. The 
first section below outlines the developments within the discipline of 
economics that led to the doctrine of profit maximization, while the 
second section sets these developments within a larger historical and 
social context.  
A. The Roots of “Profit Maximization” 
One can think of the historical development of the doctrine of 
profit maximization as having roughly three major stages. These are 
briefly sketched below. 
The first stage was the origination, during the classical period of 
economics, of the idea that the economy is a machine driven by the 
energy of self-interest. Scottish philosopher Adam Smith is widely 
considered to be the originator of market views of economics. While 
he was actually a much more subtle thinker (especially on topics of 
moral philosophy), he is mostly known in contemporary circles for 
expressing the idea that the individual pursuit of self-interest might 
be coordinated to serve the social good by the invisible hand of the 
market system. Since Smith wrote at the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, when people were fascinated with factories and 
technology, he used the popular mechanistic metaphors of his day. 
―Power and riches‖ he wrote, are ―enormous and operose 
machines.‖78 The ―wheels,‖ he continued, can be made to move in 
harmony when one attends to ―the connexions and dependencies of 
its several parts.‖79 The idea of the economy-as-machine appeared a 
few years earlier in the work of François Quesnay and the Marquis de 
Mirabeau in 1763, and was carried forward in the later work of 
classical economists Thomas Robert Malthus and Karl Marx in their 
 
 78. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS pt. IV.I.8 (1759). 
 79. Id. pt. IV.I.11. 
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search for ―laws‖ of economics that would be similar to the ―laws‖ of 
Newtonian physics.
80
  
Sixty years later, the development of profit maximization theory 
entered its second stage with the creation of the image of ―economic 
man.‖ John Stuart Mill‘s 1836 essay ―On the Definition of Political 
Economy‖ attempted to define economics as a scientific enterprise, 
distinct from other endeavors.
81
 Mill did not deny that, empirically 
speaking, people care about each other, are emotional, and are 
embedded in society.
82
 But he felt that a certain narrowing of 
assumptions about human behavior was necessary for economics, 
since he took geometry as his model of science.
83
 Political Economy 
and geometry, he claimed, both ―must necessarily reason . . . from 
assumptions, not from facts.‖84 In order to get to a pure abstract 
definition of ―man‖ that could be used in this deductive science, he 
separated the sciences into four parts. Physical science, Mill said, 
would deal with physical laws in the material world.
85
 Ethics would 
deal with conscience, duty, and other feelings relevant to a person‘s 
dealings with other people.
86
 Social economy would study life in 
society.
87
 Economics proper would deal with what is left over after 
the body, ethics, and social relationships have been removed: a 
creature ―who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of 
judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that 
end‖88—an autonomous, self-interested, and rational agent, later 
dubbed homo economicus, or ―economic man.‖ Mill, to his credit, 
argued that no political economist would ever be ―so absurd as to 
suppose that mankind‖ is really described by only these parts of 
human nature, and that in any practical application economics would 
 
 80. See Abhijit Vinayak Banjeree, Inside the Machine: Toward a New Development 
Economics, BOSTON REV., Mar.–Apr. 2007, http://bostonreview.net/BR32.2/banerjee.php 
(discussing the history of the ―economy-as-machine‖ metaphor). 
 81. John Stuart Mill, On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method of 
Philosophical Investigation in That Science, 4 LONDON & WESTMINSTER REV. 1 (1836). 
 82. Id. at 10.  
 83. Id. at 16–17.  
 84. Id. at 16. 
 85. Id. at 5–6.  
 86. Id. at 10.  
 87. Id. at 11. 
 88. Id. at 12. 
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need to be complemented by the other sciences and experience.
89
 But 
it was the elegance of his stripped-down agent, not these caveats, that 
has been carried forward in economic thought.  
Even as Mill was writing, the groundwork was being laid for the 
third stage in the development of ―profit maximization‖: the 
discovery of a way of drawing a closer analogy between economics 
and Newtonian physics through the use of differential calculus. 
Augustin Cournot‘s 1838 volume Researches into the Mathematical 
Principles of the Theory of Wealth contained the first statement of 
profit maximization.
90
 He modeled a monopolist as having a 
mathematical revenue function and a mathematical cost function, 
both of which increase with the quantity of output it sells.
91
 By rules 
of calculus and many assumptions about the nature and shape of 
these hypothetical curves, the function that subtracts costs from 
revenues—that is, the ―profit function‖—is maximized when the first 
derivatives of the two curves are set equal to each other.
92
 Cournot‘s 
work, however, was ignored for decades. It was not until later in the 
1800s, in the time period in the history of economics known as the 
―marginalist revolution,‖ that the use of calculus became more 
widespread to explain consumer behavior (maximization of utility) as 
well as firm behavior (maximization of profit). Figures such as 
Francis Edgeworth, Vilredo Pareto, William Stanley Jevons, and 
Leon Walras developed these methods.
93
 With the publication of 
Alfred Marshall‘s Principles of Economics in 1890, the mathematical 
and diagrammatic analysis of maximization behavior became 
enshrined as the backbone of ―neoclassical‖ economics, which is the 
dominant school to this day.
94
  
The problem is not that people use metaphors such as ―the 
economy is a machine,‖ with its corollary ―a firm is a profit 
function.‖ We need metaphors to be able to think at all. But problems 
 
 89. Id. at 13, 24. 
 90. ANTOINE AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES 
OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (1838).  
 91. Id. at 56–65.  
 92. INGRID HAHNE RIMA, DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 221 (7th ed. 2009). 
 93. Id. at 255.  
 94. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890); see also RIMA, supra note 
92, at 318–48.  
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arise when metaphors become atrophied, or when they are so much a 
part of our thinking that we forget that they are simply tools and not 
literal representations.
95
 The idea that firms not only make profit, but 
must also maximize profits, was born out of particular metaphorical 
understandings of economies, science, and business. 
B. Socio-Historical Context 
The developments within economics reflected a larger historical 
and cultural picture. As a number of writers on the history and 
philosophy of science pointed out during the 1980s, dualisms such as 
those shown in Table 1 have underlain much of Western philosophy 
and culture.
96
 Rationality, autonomy, and math, for example, all have 
masculine cultural associations and have come to be associated with 
science and power in the realms of market and state. Emotion, 
dependence, and qualitative analysis, on the other hand, have all 
commonly been seen as more feminine and associated with the 
humanities or family life. This view was institutionalized into notions 
of science during its Enlightenment-era origins, when the scientific 
enterprise was described as attempting to ―raise a masculine 
 
 95. Alfred Marshall himself, interestingly enough, was very aware that he was using 
physics-like equations metaphorically, and that these metaphors had limitations:  
It has been well said that analogies may help one into the saddle, but are encumbrances 
on a long journey. It is well to know when to introduce them, it is even better to know 
when to stop them off. Two things may resemble one another in their initial stages; 
and a comparison of the two may then be helpful; but after a while they diverge; and 
then the comparison begins to confuse and warp the judgment. 
ALFRED MARSHALL, MECHANICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ANALOGIES IN ECONOMICS (1898), 
reprinted in MEMORIALS OF ALFRED MARSHALL 312, 314 (A.C. Pigou ed., 1925)). His 
followers, however, have not been so cautious. 
 96. See, e.g., EVELYN FOX KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985) 
(presenting a collection of essays focusing on how a ―complex dynamic‖ of cognitive, 
emotional, and social forces has driven the interplay of science with masculinity and 
femininity); SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986) (discussing 
feminist science critiques which note that the history and philosophy of science has been shaped 
by the masculine/feminine dualism); Susan Bordo, The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought, 
11 SIGNS 439, 448–56 (1986); BRIAN EASLEA, WITCH HUNTING, MAGIC AND THE NEW 
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION TO DEBATES OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 1450–1750 
(1980) (discussing the gender dualisms during the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries). 
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Philosophy . . . whereby the Mind of Man my be ennobled with the 
knowledge of Solid Truths.‖97  
TABLE 1: SPLITTING THE WORLD: WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 
Higher Order Lower Order 
mind body 
rationality emotion 
autonomy dependence 
self-interest other-interest 
quantitative qualitative 
general particular 
masculine feminine 
It is critically important to note that the point being made is about 
how we think, and not about differences between men and women. 
Feminists often make a distinction between ―sex‖ and ―gender,‖ 
wherein sex refers to biological differences between males and 
females, while gender refers to cultural beliefs constructed on the 
base of (preponderant) sexual dimorphism.
98
 Therefore, the issue is 
not whether men, for example, have more mind or less body than 
women: they manifestly do not. Rather, the point is that there is a 
deep cultural pattern of defining male as being dichotomously 
different from, and more powerful than, female, and defining minds 
as being radically disconnected from, and more powerful than, 
nature, matter, and emotion.  
The notion of ―economic man,‖ initiated by Mill, is doubly 
gendered—and doubly biased. First, in omitting all aspects of human 
life having to do with bodies, emotion, dependence, or other-interest, 
it highlights only culturally masculine-associated notions of humanity 
and precludes consideration of feminine-associated ones. Not only 
are the traditionally female occupations of feeding, cleaning, and 
nursing bodies made invisible, but everyone‟s experiences of social 
 
 97. KELLER, supra note 96, at 52 (quoting Henry Oldenburg).  
 98. Recent feminist literature has become more complicated as scholars deal with 
intersexuality, transsexuality, and the like. But the sex/gender distinction provides a rough 
typology that is useful when examining cultural stereotypes. 
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life in general (and of dependency in childhood, illness, and old age 
in particular) are denied. ―Economic man,‖ in contrast to real 
humans, neither needs care nor has any responsibility or desire to 
give it. Secondly, the origin of, and continued allegiance to, 
―economic man‖ reflects the impact of a gender-biased view of 
scientific endeavor, which prioritizes mathematical and abstract 
(Newtonian) physics-like thinking, and hence is prone to favor a 
metaphor of mechanical markets over more rich or nuanced notions 
of sociality. Feminist philosophers of science have noted how this 
requires an understanding of scientific objectivity as based on a 
mythical image of distance and disconnection, rather than on a more 
rigorous base of engagement and critique.
99
 
In summary, classical and neoclassical economists did not 
discover a cold and heartless economic reality and then choose 
assumptions of self-interest and maximization because these best fit 
what they observed. Rather, economists created an image of 
economies as cold and heartless, and foisted it on the world in large 
part because it bolstered the image of economists as high-status, non-
―sissy,‖ hard scientists. The fact that it provides intellectual 
justification for self-interested actions on the part of some rich and 
well-established actors in society—who have had considerable 
political power—no doubt has contributed to the maintenance of its 
popularity and status.  
C. The Persistence of Dualistic Thinking 
Not everyone aspires to be a ―hard‖ scientist, and yet there 
persists the gendered association of economics with all things cold 
and antisocial. Within the feminist academic community, a number of 
scholars take what is sometimes called a ―relational feminist‖ 
approach and further build on these dichotomies. Legal scholar Cheri 
A. Budzynski, for example, uses such dualistic thinking to contrast a 
status quo in tort law that emphasizes efficiency, profit-
 
 99. KELLER, supra note 96, at 6–12; SUSAN R. BORDO, THE FLIGHT TO OBJECTIVITY: 
ESSAYS ON CARTESIANISM & CULTURE 97–118 (1987) (discussing the ―masculinization of 
thought‖ which took place in Europe in the seventeenth century); see also JULIE A. NELSON, 
FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY AND ECONOMICS (1996) (discussing gender, specifically masculine-
biased notions, in the field of economics). 
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maximization, and reason with a more ―feminist‖ (or, more 
accurately, stereotypically ―feminine‖) orientation towards an ―ethic 
of care‖ that includes emotion and abandons efficiency.100 In The 
Commercialization of Intimate Life, sociologist Arlie Hochschild 
repeatedly frames her argument in terms of two worlds: a harsh, 
depersonalized world of intrinsically destabilizing capitalism, and an 
ethical, caring world of non-monetized family and community 
relations: ―When in the mid-nineteenth century, men were drawn into 
market life and women remained outside it, female homemakers 
formed a moral brake on capitalism.‖101  
Another example comes from an older piece on the topic of this 
symposium: the 1960 article Love and the Business Corporation by 
Bert S. Prunty.
102
 His rhetoric explicitly associates profit interests in 
corporate law with masculinity, while associating philanthropy-
allowing developments in corporate law with a lack of masculinity. 
The ―once virile ultra vires doctrine‖ was weakened by the growing 
permission of philanthropy, he writes, although the limitation of 
philanthropy to purposes in the corporate interest means that ―the 
dictum of Dodge v. Ford has not been emasculated.‖103 
A clue to the persistence of such images may be found in recent 
psychological research on ―cognitive schema.‖ This term refers to the 
ways that we ―organize incoming information and integrate it—
through no conscious act of will—into clusters.‖104 Stimuli that 
correspond to an existing schema can be more rapidly processed than 
stimuli that must be individually sorted and assimilated piece by 
piece. Categorization according to associations with masculinity or 
femininity is one notable method of clustering.
105
 For example, in one 
 
 100. Budzynski, supra note 28, at 459–60.  
 101. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTIMATE LIFE: NOTES 
FROM HOME AND WORK 8 (2003). 
 102. Bert S. Prunty, Jr., Love and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REV. 467 (1960). 
 103. Id. at 468, 475 (emphasis added). 
 104. Steven B. Most et al., Auditory Stroop Reveals Implicit Gender Associations in Adults 
and Children, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287, 287 (2007). 
 105. See generally Kristine M. Knutson et al., Neural Correlates of Automatic Beliefs 
About Gender and Race, 28 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 915, 927 (2007) (identifying specific brain 
activity associated with the expression and suppression of stereotypic gender attitudes); Sandra 
Lipsitz Bem, Gender Schema Theory: A Cognitive Account of Sex Typing, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 
354, 355 (1981) (describing a ―gender schema‖ as a gender-based ―network of associations that 
organizes and guides an individual‘s perception‖); Brian A. Nosek et al., National Differences 
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type of experiment, subjects are asked to push a particular keyboard 
button when a stimulus flashed on a screen matches certain 
conditions. The experiment found that combinations that are 
consistent with an association of ―male‖ with ―strong,‖ or ―female‖ 
with ―weak,‖ which are common in the dominant American culture, 
tend to be more quickly processed, on average, than ones that 
combine ―female‖ with ―strong.‖106 Moreover, research on ―cognitive 
fluency‖ suggests that what we consider easy we are also more likely 
to think of as true.
107
 As academics we like to think of ourselves as 
sophisticated and eager to delve into complexities, but it may be 
worthwhile to reflect on the extent to which common gender 
dualisms and the desire for quick and simple answers may be behind 
our thinking on ―love versus money.‖ 
D. Overcoming Dualistic Thinking 
While our minds may have a tendency to think otherwise, we live 
in a world that includes weak men, strong women, money used in 
loving ways (e.g., gifts and assistance),
108
 close relationships used in 
cold ways (e.g., abuse), emotions manipulated in markets (e.g., 
advertising), and rationality used at home (e.g., the fact that smooth 
household functioning takes thought). Most academics would 
acknowledge that our motivations for work include both extrinsic 
ones (e.g., we need to support ourselves and our families) and 
intrinsic ones (e.g., intellectual stimulation). Simple dualisms such as 
male/female, money/love, and reason/emotion cannot be the whole 
story. In the psychological research, being able to think in ways 
contrary to existing schema is often interpreted as a sign of mental 
agility. Similarly, not having blinders on when we look at 
 
in Gender-Science Stereotypes Predict National Sex Differences in Science and Math 
Achievement, 106 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 10593–97 (2009). 
 106. Knutson et al., supra note 105, at 916.  
 107. Drake Bennett, Easy = True: How „Cognitive Fluency‟ Shapes What We Believe, How 
We Invest, and Who Will Become a Supermodel, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2010, http://www. 
boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/01/31/easy_true/. 
 108. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 27 (2005); VIVIANA A. 
ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 71–118 (1994) (exploring the nature and history of 
money used in interpersonal and intimate relations). 
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commercial life may expose to us richer realities and future 
possibilities.  
V. THE RELATIONAL ECONOMY  
Mainstream economic thought, built on a machine metaphor and 
physics-mimicking methodology, encourages us to think of the 
economy as something set apart from society, running according to 
its own ―laws‖ and powered by the ―drive‖ to profit-maximize. 
Stepping outside of that narrow dogma, however, reveals a much 
richer and more complex world of people, motivations, institutions, 
and relationships, even within the spheres of business and markets. 
A. Alternative Schools of Thought 
Work within feminist, social, and (―Old‖) Institutionalist 
economics takes as a starting point the social embeddedness of 
economic life.
109
 A large business literature exists concerning the 
creation of value not for just shareholders, but for workers, 
consumers, communities and others within corporate institutions.
110
 
Social and ecological innovations such as triple bottom line 
accounting are being taught at some business schools and achieving a 
following among some business leaders.
111
 Many business 
relationships are governed by implicit (as opposed to explicit, cold, 
and distant) contracts because of psychological reasons related to 
motivation and trust, as well as foundational problems of uncertainty 
 
 109. BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS (Marianne A. Ferber 
& Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993) (collection of essays introducing feminist approaches to 
economics, all of which in some way allude to embeddedness); Hodgson, supra note 16, at 
168–69. See generally John B. Davis & Wilfred Dolfsma, Social Economics: An Introduction 
and a View of the Field, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO SOCIAL ECONOMICS 1, 2–3 (John B. 
Davis & Wilfred Dolfsma eds., 2008). 
 110. See, e.g., JAMES C. COLLINS & JERRY I. PORRAS, BUILT TO LAST: SUCCESSFUL 
HABITS OF VISIONARY COMPANIES 46–79 (1994) (discussing companies which view business 
as more than simply profit maximization); FREEMAN, supra note 21 (discussing the importance 
of promoting the idea of these various ―stakeholders,‖ rather than only shareholders, having 
interest in a firm); see also sources cited supra notes 22, 61. 
 111. The Triple Bottom Line: Student Activists Demand More from B-Schools, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 19, 2003), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm? 
articleid=773. 
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and lack of information.
112
 A number of scholars of business 
contracts emphasize their often incomplete and relational or 
expressive nature: Since completely specified contracts would be 
impossible to write, impossible to enforce, and bind their parties to 
things that might not be in their mutual advantage in the future, 
ongoing communication is of the essence of many commercial and 
financial relationships.
113
 Market relationships, while often 
envisioned as impersonal and ―arm‘s length,‖ may in fact include 
considerable interpersonal dimensions. Much scholarship in 
economic sociology and the social study of finance explores these 
points, by investigating phenomena such as reputation, trust, or 
collusion.
114
 Often, of course, such studies are dismissed as ―soft‖ or 
―non-rigorous‖ by those who argue for ―hard,‖ ―bottom-line‖ profit-
maximization views of commercial life. The reader, however, should 
weigh how well the socially embedded versus ―machine‖ views hold 
up against real-world evidence.  
B. “Commodification” versus “Commoditization” 
What about the issue of ―commodification‖? If the economic 
world is actually highly relational, does that mean there is nothing to 
fear from the inroads of markets or commercially-oriented values? 
Here it is important to distinguish between two quite different 
meanings of the terms ―commodify‖ or ―commoditize.‖ 
Within the social science literature, particularly in areas 
influenced by Marxist thought or dealing with globalization, 
―commodification‖ (or, more rarely, ―commoditization‖) generally 
 
 112. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 687 (2002). 
 113. IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: INSTRUMENTS FOR SOCIAL COOPERATION: EAST 
AFRICA (1968) (one of the generative sources of relational contract theory); Stewart Macaulay, 
Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil 
and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 795 (2000); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive 
Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in 
Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1283–84 (1998). 
 114. Marieke de Goede, Resocialising and Repoliticising Financial Markets: Contours of 
Social Studies of Finance, ECON. SOC.: EUR. ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER, July 2005, at 19, 20–
21 (2005); THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 3–25 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard 
Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005); Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Moral Views of Market 
Society, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 285, 288–89 (2007). 
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means the commercialization of something not formerly bought and 
sold. The connotation is negative, since it is assumed that placing a 
monetary value on something drains it of its intrinsic value and 
uniqueness, causing a loss of authentic values.
115
  
Within the business literature, on the other hand, 
―commoditization‖ (or, more rarely, ―commodification‖) refers to 
making something into a very specific type of good or service.
116
 A 
good or service is a ―commodity‖ when all units of it are 
indistinguishable from one another. Raw materials and minerals, for 
example, are called commodities because one bushel of wheat or bar 
of gold of a specific type and grade is physically indistinguishable 
from another. Not all goods and services are commodities, since 
many recognizably differ from each other along dimensions such as 
quality, brand name, reputability of the supplier, or the relationship 
between the supplier and purchaser. A purchaser who prefers one 
brand of canned corn over another, or a parent who finds the services 
of one child care provider to be superior to those of another, for 
example, are not buying ―commodities.‖ Within the business 
literature, the terms carry no unambiguous positive or negative 
association. Businesses that have market power based on unique 
features of their product will resist allowing it to become a widely 
supplied, undistinguishable commodity. On the other hand, buyers of 
a good may often want the standardization and lowered prices from 
increased competition that a degree of commoditization can bring.
117
 
For goods and services that are commodities, a buyer may simply 
look for the lowest price, since all other factors are held constant.  
 
 115. See, e.g., Globalization Glossary, GENDER & HEALTH COLLABORATIVE CURRICULUM 
PROJECT (July 29, 2008), http://www.genderandhealth.ca/en/modules/globalization/globaliza 
tion_glossary.jsp.  
 116. See Commodification, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://financial-dictionary.thefree 
dictionary.com/commodification (last visited Mar. 3, 2011); Commoditize, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commoditize (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). For 
a brief and cogent discussion of the difference between the business view and the Marxist view, 
see Douglas Rushkoff, Commodified vs. Commoditized, DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF (Sept. 4, 2005), 
http://rushkoff.com/2005/09/04/commodified-vs-commoditized/.  
 117. While Rushkoff notes that commoditization is a problem for manufacturers, for 
example, The Free Dictionary notes that commoditization ―leads to lower prices,‖ which are 
presumably of benefit to consumers. See sources cited supra note 116.  
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Where things get confused is at the distinction between the 
market/nonmarket boundary and the commodity/non-commodity 
boundary. The Marxist-influenced view assumes that once something 
is traded in capitalist markets, it automatically becomes a commodity: 
marketization equals commoditization equals the erasure of unique 
values. This belief arises from the more fundamental conviction that 
the economy is an asocial machine, and that businesses have no 
choice but to treat everything strictly according to their market values 
and contributions to profit maximization. This Article has sought to 
shed doubt on this model. 
The business definition, on the other hand, recognizes that 
commodities are a special category. In general, goods and services 
can be traded in markets and have distinguishing characteristics. 
When it is recognized that business behavior and market trades are 
embedded in social relations, then one can more precisely identify the 
case of harmful commoditization. It does not occur simply with 
marketization, but with a particular kind of marketization that 
overlooks unique characteristics and special relationships that should 
be preserved. Corporate leaders who treat their employees as merely 
rented hands and brains, interchangeable and expendable, exhibit 
anti-social values, as do those who recognize environmental 
problems only when they become explicit cost items on their income 
statements. Choosing to encourage employee morale and loyalty, on 
the other hand, or to contract with more ethical subcontractors and 
greener suppliers, is an alternative, non-commoditizing possibility.
 118
 
Even some types of goods normally called ―commodities‖ may be 
treated in a non-commoditized way. For example, while bars of gold 
may be physically identical, a purchaser who is cognizant of the 
effect of mining on human and ecological well-being may distinguish 
between them based on the practices under which the gold was 
extracted. 
While scholars outside of business tend to draw the 
―commodification‖ line at the market borderline, many scholars 
 
 118. In reality, the entry of corporations is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
commoditization of the negative variety. Some state and non-profit educational institutions, for 
example, have adopted commodifying philosophies. See DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE 
MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2004). 
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inside worry about the commoditization of business and finance 
themselves. Many business organizations have had cultures that have 
included a feeling of pride in their product or in their historical 
legacy.
119
 A number of commentators have lamented the tendency for 
recent waves of mergers and acquisitions by private equity firms to 
commoditize business itself, erasing aspects of social meaning, 
institutional identity, and professional ethics within the commercial 
world.
120
 Others have contrasted ―commodified‖ financial 
instruments to more traditional long-term banking relationships.
121
 
This shift contributed to the explosion of standardized securities of 
dubious worth that created the recent financial crisis.
122
 
One could argue that the huge increases in CEO salaries seen in 
recent decades are partly due to managerial services being 
―commoditized‖ by way of adoption of neoclassical theories of 
―economic man.‖ Unable to believe that any executive would have 
sufficient incentive to manage a business in the interest of 
shareholders (and/or employees, customers, the community, society, 
etc.) for a mere fair and reasonable salary, neoclassical economists 
invented the aforementioned ―principal-agent theory.‖123 Giving 
CEOs stock options and bonuses based on company share prices or 
other contingent goals would, it was believed, align their pecuniary 
interests with the shareholders‘ and lead to greater efforts towards 
profit maximization.
124
 But if executives are opportunistic enough to 
 
 119. See sources cited supra note 110.  
 120. See, e.g., Peter Osnos, Buyers and Sellers, CENTURY FOUND (Nov. 27, 2006), http:// 
www.tcf.org/commentary/2006/nc1449 (protesting against ―the notion of media businesses as 
commodities‖); Julie Creswell, Profits for Buyout Firms as Company Debt Soared, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2009, at A1 (description of the Simmons mattress company case).  
 121. See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Finance Made the World Riskier?, 12 EUR. FIN. 
MGMT. 499, 504 (2006) (discussing ―commodified‖ financial transactions as compared to long-
term banking relations). 
 122. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about 
Cases and Remedies, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 606 (2009).  
 123. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 41.  
 124. In marked contrast to economists‘ treatment of the male-dominated occupation of 
CEO, economists‘ attention to occupations dominated by women can go to the opposite 
gendered extreme. See, e.g., Anthony Heyes, The Economics of Vocation or „Why Is a Badly 
Paid Nurse a Good Nurse‟?, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 561 (2005) (arguing that the way to get good 
performance from nurses is to pay nursing badly, since this would presumably guarantee that 
only altruists would take the job). For a critique of Heyes‘s article, see Julie A. Nelson & Nancy 
Folbre, Why a Well-Paid Nurse Is a Better Nurse, 24 NURSING ECON. 127 (2006). 
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care only about their own compensation and not about the unique 
history and qualities of their company, they are also opportunistic 
enough to figure out how to game this system. A number have done 
exactly this, aiming to maintain a short-term illusion of profitability 
just long enough to cash in their options, or sitting as directors on 
each others‘ boards and granting each other big bonuses based on 
meeting routine goals. Others who are less opportunistic have resisted 
these temptations. 
Commentators often use terms like ―market values‖ or ―business 
interests‖ to point to dehumanizing, social-meaning-depleting values 
of profit maximization at all costs.
125
 The essence of deleterious 
commoditization, however, is the assumption that everything is 
interchangeable, commensurable, quality-less and quantifiable into a 
corporate ―bottom line‖—not something intrinsic in business or 
markets per se. We do business leaders, ourselves, and the world an 
extreme disservice if we impute to all businesses and markets only 
the ―love-less‖ characteristics and motivations invented by the 
neoclassical model of economics. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The sort of commoditization which is to be feared is not the 
simple entry of prices, money, or market relations into realms of 
significant human and social meaning. Commercial relations are 
often themselves saturated with social meaning and relationality. 
Rather, it is the entry of narrow, profit-maximization values and 
related specific structures that, by reducing the value of everything to 
its contribution to a ―bottom line,‖ threaten to drain human meaning.  
The role of academics in economics, the other social sciences, and 
law in this process is a very important one. To the extent that we 
teach that firms must maximize profits or shareholder value because 
that is their ―nature‖ or ―purpose,‖ we undermine the very social 
values that we believe we are defending. Not only do we perpetuate a 
myth, we promote a dangerously self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 
 125. See, e.g., David Loy, Religion and the Market (1997), http://www.religious 
consultation.org/loy.htm (―[M]arket values lead to a decline in the quality of our social 
relationships . . . .‖).  
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It is easy to think in ―love versus money‖ terms, and many 
pressures in society and politics push in that direction. Because 
conventional narrow economic theory is currently elevated in prestige 
above the actual observation of economic life, challenging this 
dualism within scholarly work is often met with much condescension. 
If we are to have any hope at all, however, of creating a more humane 
economy, we need to consider real-world phenomena of ―love and 
money,‖ and explore the opportunities these present. Incorporating 
these into our theory and practice, we might have a chance of 
building an intellectual, moral, commercial, and political 
infrastructure that could sustain human and ecological life. 
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